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FundamentalismReborn?WilliamMaley, ed. (NewYork:New York
University Press, 1998.Pp. 253)
Tiris volume covers recent developments in Afghanistan.
Althoughfundamentalismis addressedin some of the articles,the title
is somewhatmisleading. The subjectof the book is Afghanistan, not
fundamentalism.
The data are very timely, includingeven eventsthat occurred
in 1998.The editor begins the book with a brief account of the rise of
the Taliban (plural of talib, religious student) in the seminaries of
Pakistan. The Taliban are Pushtuns, the ethnic group of southern
Afghanistanand part of Pakistan.Once the Taliban achievedmilitary
success in Afghanistan, secular Pushtuns, including former communists, integrated into the movement; thus some of the contributing
authors view the Taliban as the continueddominance of Afghanistan
by its largest ethnic group, the Pushtuns.
The Taliban are fundamentalistsin that they aim to use the
coercivepower of the state to insure that Afghanis obey the "dictates
of the faith" as interpreted by the Taliban's religious authority,
Muhammad Omar (18-19). The Rabbani government (1992-1996)
was also fundamentalist, but Rabbani was the political leader of
Jamiat-e Islami, a predominantly Tajik (Persian-speaking Sunni)
group. Th~ Jamiat was opposed by the Pakistani-supportedHezb-e
Islami, a Pushtun group led by GulbuddinHekmatyar.
Since Pakistan gave out the "lion's share of American arms
and other foreignaid to the Mujahidin"fighting againstAfghanistan's
communist government, any group Pakistan backed was greatly
strengthened vis-a-visother Afghangroups (37).Pakistanbacked first
Hekmatyar and then, when he proved incapable of getting control of
the country, shifted its sponsorshipto the Taliban.
Pakistan's overridinginterestin Afghanistanis in developing
a sectrretrade route through Afghanistanto Central Asia. Pakistan's
foreign policy has therefore been to create an Afghan military group
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capable of pacifying Afghanistan and willing to cooperate with
Pakistan in moving Central Asian oil to world markets . Despite all the
assistance the Taliban has received from Pakistan , it is not a puppet,
e.g. Taliban detention of a Russian aircrew in 1995-6 was against
Pakistani advice.
The primary financial backer of the Taliban has been Saudi
Arabia , but now that most of Afghanistan is under their control, they
are able to collect 'taxes ' from heroin traders and transporters of other
goods .
Once Madelaine Albright became U.S. Secretary of State,
American government acceptance of the Taliban was diminished but
not ended. The U.S . position is influenced by the fact that the main
contender for the pipeline to bring Central Asian oil to international
markets is a coalition of UNOCAL of California and Delta Oil of
Saudi Arabia. The two have signed an agreement with Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and powerful Washington lobbies such as
the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) along with
many members of Congress strongly support the Afghanistan-Pakistan
route for the pipeline. Because of the Taliban 's human rights violations and policies toward drug traders , the State Department is much
less enthusiastic.
Although Russia and the Central Asian governments need an
oil pipeline , they fear militant fundamentalism and do not want the
Taliban to get control of all Afghanistan . Thus they have been
providing humanitarian assistance and some logistical support to the
non-Pushtun groups in northern Afghanistan. Iran also supports the
Northern Alliance, the anti-Pushtun coalition which has prevented the
Taliban from getting control of the whole country . The United
Nations has delivered humanitarian assistance to all the groups in
Afghanistan , but it has been hampered by the absence of a government
partner , the Taliban having shown no administrative capacity.
The Taliban insistence on separate educational and health
facilities for women has meant very few Afghan women get any of
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either. h1 her article on Afghan women , Nancy Hatch Dupree reports
Taliban statements that Afghan women have to be kept out of sight
because they might be sexually dishonored if they appear in public,
the old argument that women ' s freedom hasto be sacrificed to keep
men from sinning. She also reports that after the leftist coup of 1978,
some Afghani women were "flaunting their sexuality" (153n), but
avoids challenging this claim as justification for depriving all Afghan
women of their freedom. The author does point out that the Taliban's
not allowing Afghani women to work hasreduced many of them to
begging, something that was not seen in Afghanistan before the
Taliban.
Bernt Glatzer provides an easy-to-follow exposition of
Afghani ethnic groups and tribes. He does not see Afghanistan as
close to ethnic or tribal disintegration but acknowledges that it could
happen.
William Maley reviews the several failed UN mediation
efforts in Afghanistan and blames UN ignorance about Afghanistan
for a long list of mistakes, including providing sanctuary to Najibullah
and undermining the Rabbani government. His most telling criticism
is one that can be leveled at the UN in other countries as well, namely
misapplying the idea ofneutrality by blaming all sides equally. Bosnia
and south Lebanon come to mind.
Olivier Roy distinguishes between traditional fimdamentalism
that has been pervasive in modern Afghan history, and two Islamist
movements in Afghanistan, the primarily Tajik Jamiat and the Pushtun
Hezb. He dubs the Taliban neo-fimdamentalist and describes neofundamentalism as blending traditional fimdamentalism with antiShi'ism and an "anti-Western cultural and political bias" (202). He
attributes neo-fimdamentalism to Arab volunteers in the Afghan
Mujahidin and anticipates a return to traditional fundamentalism in
Afghanistan.
h1 the last article Shahrani advocates a return to loose
federation as the only workable political model for Afghanistan . He
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believes Islamism has been discredited by the war between the Jamiat
and the Hezb and by the Taliban version of Islam. He argues that a
centralized state dominated by the Taliban or another Pushtun group
would require severe repression and foreign assistance to maintain its
control, if it could get control. He laments the fact that some Western
governments have been convinced "that there cannot be an Afghanistan without Pushtun leadership" (233). Exactly how the "looselystructured federal system" (239) would operate is not spelled out, but
he refers to a central government in which "shura" (consultation)
would apply while governance would be by local officials.
Joyce Wiley
University of South Carolina Spartanburg

VOL. 261998

